Key Takeaways
- The Bank of Canada's balance sheet peaked near $575 billion in the pandemic and stood at $240.5 billion at the end of 2025
- In normal times it is driven by its liabilities — the cash in Canadians' wallets and the government's deposits — not by policy experiments
- The Bank runs almost no capital by design, and is currently working off an accumulated deficit of about $9.9 billion from its pandemic-era bond buying
The strangest balance sheet in Canada
Every balance sheet tells a story, and the Bank of Canada's tells an unusual one: it belongs to an institution that can create the very thing it owes, holds almost no capital, and is currently sitting on an accumulated deficit of roughly $9.9 billion — by design, and without threatening its ability to do its job.
At the end of 2025, the Bank's total assets were $240.5 billion, down from $277.2 billion a year earlier and less than half the pandemic peak of close to $575 billion. Here is what is actually on it, and why.
The quiet side: bank notes and deposits
In normal times, the Bank's balance sheet is driven by its liabilities — the things it owes — not by its assets. The biggest is the cash in your wallet: bank notes in circulation were $124.3 billion at the end of 2025, growing steadily with the economy. The other large liability, grouped as deposits ($124.4 billion), includes the federal government's deposits at its own central bank and the settlement balances that commercial banks hold there to settle payments with each other.
Against those liabilities, the Bank passively holds mostly Government of Canada bonds and treasury bills — $192.2 billion of investments at the end of 2025 — so that its assets roughly match what it owes. Before the pandemic, the Bank ran settlement balances of just $250 million. That tiny number becomes important in a moment.
The loud years: when the asset side took over
Twice in recent memory — the 2008–09 financial crisis and COVID-19 — the Bank deliberately flipped the model, expanding the asset side for policy reasons and paying for the purchases by creating settlement balances. In the pandemic, that took the balance sheet from about $120 billion to nearly $575 billion. The unwind since then is why the total keeps shrinking: as pandemic-era bonds mature, they are no longer fully replaced. In 2025 the Bank described itself as back to "normal balance sheet management," restarting term repo purchases in March and treasury bill purchases in December, while normal-course bond buying is not expected before 2027.
Why a central bank can run a deficit
A commercial bank with negative equity is insolvent. A central bank is different, and the Bank's structure makes the point vividly: its share capital is $5 million, its statutory reserve is capped at $25 million, and by law (section 27 of the Bank of Canada Act) essentially everything it earns above those reserves is handed to the federal government as "ascertained surplus." In good years, that arrangement sends Ottawa billions — the profit, called seigniorage, on issuing currency and holding government bonds.
The pandemic purchases reversed the flow. The Bank had bought long-term bonds at very low interest rates, then had to pay much higher interest on the swollen settlement balances those purchases created. The result: net losses of $5.65 billion in 2023, $3.08 billion in 2024 and $82 million in 2025, and equity of negative $8.5 billion. One protection did apply: under indemnity agreements from 2020, if the Bank ever sells its pandemic-era program assets at a loss, the federal government covers it — those agreements sat on the balance sheet as a $19.3 billion asset at the end of 2025. The indemnity does not cover the interest losses, though, which is why a 2023 change to the Bank of Canada Act lets the Bank keep its future surpluses to rebuild its position instead of remitting them, until the deficit is gone.
Why should you care?
The Bank's balance sheet is not just an accounting curiosity. It affects the government's finances, the amount of money in circulation, and the cost of borrowing for everyone. When the Bank runs a deficit, it means less money flowing to Ottawa — and that affects the federal budget. When the Bank buys bonds, it influences interest rates. And when it manages settlement balances, it ensures the payments system works smoothly every day.
The deficit is real, but it is not a crisis. The Bank is not going bankrupt. It is simply working through the consequences of pandemic-era decisions, one bond maturity at a time.
The Twikup Take
The Bank of Canada's balance sheet is best read as a public utility's, not a bank's: tiny capital, profits swept to the government, and a pandemic hangover it is patiently earning its way out of. The deficit makes headlines; the mechanics — cash, settlement balances, and bonds bought to match them — are the part that actually runs the country's payments system every day. Understanding those mechanics is the key to understanding why a $9.9 billion deficit does not mean the Bank is in trouble — it means it did its job during a crisis, and is now cleaning up after it.
Image: Illustrative image.
